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Federal courts scholarship tends to focus on the reasoning and
implications of Supreme Court decisions for specific jurisdictional
problems, such as standing, Supreme Court review of state decisions, federal-state comity, and the eleventh amendment. Although
this kind of scholarship is illuminating and useful, it is necessarily
limited in its aspirations. Scholars pay too little attention to aspects of the Court's work that transcend the case at hand or the
area of doctrine in which it arises. To fully understand the law of
federal courts, one must examine developments over a range of
doctrinal categories and study the patterns that emerge from comparing them.
One such theme is the role of substantive interests in explaining
federal courts doctrine. The thesis of this Article is that substantive factors exert a powerful and often unrecognized influence over
the resolution of jurisdictional issues, and have done so throughout
our history. The chief substantive factors at issue are the government's interest in regulating behavior on the one hand, and the
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individual's interest in enforcing constitutional restraints upon
government on the other. Decisions easing access to federal district
court, like the taxpayer standing rule of Flast v. Cohen' or the liberal construction of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 laid down in Monroe v.
Pape,2 reflect a desire to promote the individual's substantive interests. Burger Court decisions such as Younger v. Harris3 and Allen v. Wright,4 which restrict availability of a federal forum, and
Michigan v. Long,5 which broadens Supreme Court review of state
court judgments favoring the constitutional claimant, are based on
a preference for the state's substantive interests.
The Supreme Court rarely adverts to such concerns in explaining its decisions. On the contrary, the Court persistently denies
their importance.' The Court treats the law of federal courts as a
body of autonomous rules wholly separate from the merits of the
underlying litigation. Supreme Court opinions give two kinds of
reasons for holdings on federal courts issues. First, as in all areas of
the law, some decisions are based on fidelity to precedent 7 and to
legislative" and constitutional9 intent. Second, to the extent courts
are not bound by these universal constraints, they make law in this
area by identifying and implementing various jurisdictional poli1. 392 U.S. 83 (1968) (in spite of previous decisions denying standing to federal taxpayers
seeking to challenge federal expenditures, federal taxpayers have standing to assert that
congressional aid to religious schools violates the establishment clause of the first
amendment).
2. 365 U.S. 167 (1961) (42 U.S.C. § 1983 creates a federal cause of action for damages or
injunctive relief against any state officer who acts under pretense of state authority, even if
his acts were not authorized or condoned by state law).
3. 401 U.S. 37 (1971) (federal-state comity bars suit in federal court seeking injunctive
relief against state proceedings on constitutional grounds).
4. 468 U.S. 737 (1984) (black parents lacked standing to challenge IRS policy toward segregated private schools).
5. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983) (Supreme Court will presume that state court has relied on federal grounds when state court opinion is ambiguous, and therefore will deem the state decision subject to Supreme Court review).
6. See, e.g., Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church
& State, 454 U.S. 464, 484 (1982); Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 105 (1980); Moore v. Sims,
442 U.S. 415, 430 (1979); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 493-94 n.35 (1976); Huffman v.
Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 611 (1975).
7. See, e.g., Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, 481 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1987); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S.
37, 45-49 (1971).
8. See, e.g., Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 238-42 (1972); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S.
167, 172-87 (1961).
9. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 346-47 (1816).
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cies bearing on the proper role of the federal courts in our system
of government. In particular, the law-making task here is to promote efficient judicial administration,0 guarantee supremacy"' and
uniformity 2 of federal law, prevent unwarranted intrusions into
the affairs of state governments, 3 and maintain the separation of
14
powers by avoiding unnecessary constitutional decisions.
Recent examples of the Court's approach include Michigan v.
Long,1 5 which held that uniformity of federal law demands Supreme Court review of ambiguous state court rulings. Younger v.
Harris6 and its progeny 17 oblige federal courts to abstain from deciding constitutional issues, in deference to state courts, because of
federal-state comity. Under PennhurstState School & Hospital v.
Halderman,8 the principle of state sovereignty embodied in the
eleventh amendment prohibits federal courts from granting relief
against state officers on state law grounds. In Allen v. Wright,'9 the
Court denied standing to litigants who had suffered no "distinct
and palpable injury" out of respect for the principle of separation
of powers. 20 Always the Court's premise is that the jurisdictional
issue is ancillary to the litigation and that the resolution of the
jurisdictional issue turns on factors quite distinct from the substantive merits of the dispute between the parties.
Federal courts scholars typically endorse the Court's concern
with jurisdictional policy. For example, Ann Althouse celebrates
Pennhurst and Long for permitting states to control the development of state law and making state courts accountable for their

10. E.g., United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966); Burford v. Sun Oil Co.,
319 U.S. 315, 327 (1943).
11. E.g., Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 105 (1984).
12. E.g., Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040 (1983); Clearfield Trust Co. v. United
States, 318 U.S. 363, 367 (1943).
13. E.g., Fair Assessment in Real Estate Ass'n v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100, 108-13 (1981);
Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 379-80 (1976).
14. E.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984); Valley Forge Christian College v.
Americans United for Separation of Church & State, 454 U.S. 464, 472-74 (1982).
15. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
16. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
17. E.g., Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, 481 U.S. 1 (1987); Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977).
18. 465 U.S. 89 (1984).
19. 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984).
20. Id. at 752.
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decisions,21 while Paul Bator defends the Younger doctrine by
stressing the institutional costs associated with federal interference
in state judicial processes. 2 Critics like Martha Field, Gene Nichol,
and Martin Redish point out serious shortcomings in the Court's
treatment of jurisdictional policy, complain that the cases are inconsistent or even "schizophrenic, ' 2 and propose reforms that
would give jurisdictional policy its due.2 4 The implicit premise of
the whole debate, shared by the Court, its academic allies, and its
critics, is that substantive interests should not influence federal
courts doctrine.
This Article challenges the Court's account of the foundations of
the law of federal courts. The root of the problem is that a wide
gap exists between what the Court says and what it does in federal
courts cases. Calling into question the Court's sincerity within the
confines of a single doctrinal area is hard, and critics must resort to
arguments against the cogency of the reasons the Court offers.
When cases from different areas are compared, however, a powerful attack can be mounted on the credibility of the Court's proffered explanations. The Court's account of the values underlying
jurisdictional decisions changes dramatically from one context to
another, and this divergence raises serious doubts as to the Court's
commitment to any of its purported reasons.
Although the Court invokes the conventional tools of judicial decision making, including legislative intent, precedent, and a number of jurisdictional policies in support of its decisions on federal
courts questions, the results reflect a strong tendency to

21. See Althouse, How To Build a Separate Sphere: Federal Courts and State Power,
100 HARv. L. REV. 1485 (1987).
22. See Bator, The State Courts and Federal Constitutional Litigation,22 Wm.& MARY

L. REV. 605 (1981).
23. See, e.g., Field, The Uncertain Nature of Federal Jurisdiction,22 WM. & MARY L.
REv. 683, 684 (1981) (much of the law of federal courts manifests "schizophrenia"); Nichol,
Rethinking Standing, 72 CALIF. L. REv. 68, 70 (1984) (standing law is "schizophrenic"); Redish, The Doctrine of Younger v. Harris: Deference in Search of a Rationale, 63 CORNEL L.
REV. 463, 483-84 (1978) (Younger cases are inconsistent); Seid, Schizoid Federalism, Supreme Court Power and Inadequate Adequate State Ground Theory: Michigan v. Long, 18
CREIGHTON L. REV. 1 (1984). Dean Nichol has since come to appreciate the importance of

substantive considerations in standing doctrine. See Nichol, Injury and the Disintegration
of Article III, 74 CALI.n. L. REv. 1915 (1986).

24. See, e.g., Nichol, Rethinking Standing, supra note 23, at 87-101; Redish, supra note
23, at 477-87.
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subordinate each and every one of these considerations in favor of
promoting the substantive interests of one side or the other in the
litigation on the merits. Over a range of topics in the law of federal
courts, including standing, the eleventh amendment immunity,
federal-state comity, and Supreme Court review of state judgments, the Court's rulings are reconcilable only on the premise
that they are directed at furthering substantive goals. The seemingly "schizophrenic" nature of the cases is not due to ineptitude
or confusion on the part of the Court. It is instead the visible manifestation of a concealed and powerful substantive subtext.25
Part I of this Article examines the relationship between jurisdictional rules and substantive consequences, Part II describes the
Court's conventional account of federal courts doctrine in terms of
jurisdictional policy and institutional roles, and Part Ill shows that
the reasons set forth in the Court's opinions lack credibility. The
rulings fit into a coherent pattern only when viewed from the perspective of the Court's substantive agenda.

25. Everyone would agree that the Court sometimes manipulates jurisdictional rules to
achieve other goals. In Naim v. Naim, 350 U.S. 985 (1956), for example, the Court refused to
hear an appeal from a state court decision upholding an antimiscegenation statute, based on
the wholly specious ground that the case presented no substantial federal question. The case
arose shortly after Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), and the Court's motive was to avoid the unpalatable choice between upholding the statute on the one hand, or
further inflaming racial tensions in the South, inviting defiance of its mandate, and perhaps
eroding its own authority in the process. See Elnan, The Solicitor General's Office, Justice
Frankfurter,and Civil Rights Litigation, 1946-60: An Oral History, 100 HARv. L. REV. 817,
845-47 (1987). Alexander Bickel argued in a brilliant and controversial book that this and
other avoidance tactics are necessary adjuncts to the Supreme Court's role as an unelected
arbiter in a nation founded on democratic principles. A. BicKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS
BRANCH: THE SuPREmE COURT AT THE BAR OF PoLrrIcs 174 (1962). Cf. Gunther, The Subtle
Vices of the "Passive Virtues"-A Comment on Principle and Expediency in JudicialReview, 64 COLUM L REv. 1 (1964) (criticizing Bickel's thesis).
The argument this Article advances is different. The argument is not about the Supreme
Court's special and delicate role as antidemocratic defender of constitutional values, or with
the Court's practice of distorting or ignoring jurisdictional rules in order to reach the result
it seeks in a particular case. This Article addresses the policy foundations of the case law on
jurisdictional issues, and shows that the warp and woof of federal courts doctrine is founded
largely on substantive aims, and not, as the Court maintains, jurisdictional policy or fidelity
to precedent or to legislative intent. This Article is concerned not with ad hoc manipulation
of the rules in special cases, but with the underpinnings of the rules themselves.
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I. THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN SUBSTANCE AND JURISDICTION

Separating substantive law from jurisdiction and procedure for
purposes of analysis is often useful, for these two broad bodies of
rules deal with different kinds of problems.26 Substantive rules are
directed at individuals and governments and tell them to do or abstain from certain conduct on pain of some sanction. Substantive
rules are based on legislative and judicial assessments of the society's wants and needs, and they help to shape the world of primary
activity outside the courtroom. Jurisdictional and procedural rules
are addressed to lawyers and judges in their professional roles and
govern the means by which disputes regarding the content or application of substantive rules should be resolved. The purpose of
these rules is to achieve accuracy, efficiency, and fair play in litigation, without regard to the substantive interests of the parties.
The distinction should not be overstated, however, for procedural rules may have substantive consequences. For example, free
speech is protected not only by substantive constitutional rules
barring criminal prosecution for materials that are merely suggestive rather than obscene, but also by procedural rules requiring a
judicial determination of obscenity before or immediately after the
materials are seized. Jurisdictional rules, which define the powers
of courts and allocate power among courts, may also affect the substantive rights and obligations of litigants. Some of these effects
are obvious enough. The availability of post-conviction remedies in
federal district court to reconsider claimed constitutional deprivations on behalf of federal and state prisoners is a means of reinforcing the substantive protection those rights afford.2 s Other jurisdictional rules affect substantive interests in a more subtle and
26. See, e.g., Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 375, 403-04 (1970); Hanna v.
Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 475-76 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring). See also P. BATOR, D. MELTZER,
P. MISHKIN & D. SHAPIRO, HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 815-17 (3d ed. 1988) [hereinafter HART & WECHSLER] (on the substance/procedure distinction in connection with the Erie doctrine). Cf. Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667,
689-93 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (procedural/substantive
distinction drawn with regard to prospective application of new rules in habeas).
27. See Monaghan, First Amendment "Due Process," 83 HARv. L. REv. 518, 532 (1970).
See also Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 520-21 (1958) (the procedures used to determine
the facts are as important as the substantive law to be applied).
28. See Cover & Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism: Habeas Corpus and the Court, 86
YALE L.J. 1035, 1045-46 (1977).
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oblique manner. This part of the Article identifies the substantive
interests typically at stake in constitutional litigation and shows
how those interests may be influenced significantly by jurisdictional rules.
A. The Substantive Conflict in ConstitutionalLitigation
Most important issues in the law of federal courts arise in the
course of constitutional litigation over the scope of individual
rights. Constitutional litigation may address a wide variety of specific issues, yet the basic clash of substantive values is always the
same. On the one hand the government seeks to achieve some aim
the electorate favors, like regulating behavior or aiding religion,
and wishes to pursue these ends without interference from courts
enforcing constitutional restrictions on government conduct. The
other value at stake is the individual's interest in expanding the
scope of her rights against government by extending the reach of
constitutional and other limits on governmental power.
It may seem rather crude and simplistic to ignore the differences
between one constitutional right and another, lump them all together, and conceive of the whole law of constitutional rights as a
struggle between the individual's interest in liberty and the government's interest in control; and indeed it is. For present purposes, however, this perspective on constitutional litigation is appropriate. Abstracting away from the wide variety of features
relating to the resolution of the substantive merits of specific constitutional issues allows us to focus on the interplay between substance and jurisdiction. Jurisdictional rulings do not influence the
content of substantive constitutional doctrine. Rather, they operate on the more general level of individual and state interests in
liberty and control. Deciding a jurisdictional issue one way or the
other does not affect the rules embodied in constitutional doctrine,
but favors one or the other of these broader, more diffuse interests.
B. The Substantive Impact of JurisdictionalRules
The opportunity to serve these substantive agendas arises from
the realities of litigation in our complex judicial system. In practice, if not in theory, jurisdictional decisions carry consequences for
the substantive rights of the parties. Success and failure in consti-
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tutional litigation turn not only on rules of law, but also on ease of
access to judicial relief and a sympathetic forum.
Three major areas in the law of federal courts, and the principal
areas of concern in this Article, are standing to sue, Supreme Court
review of state judgments, and federal-state comity. When the
Court finds a lack of standing, or decides to review an ambiguous
state judgment, or closes the door of the federal court in favor of a
state forum, it makes no explicit decision on the merits of the litigation which spawned the jurisdictional issue. In Valley Forge
Christian College v. Americans United For Separationof Church
& State,29 a group of taxpayers opposed to government aid to religion was denied standing to challenge a transfer of property to a
religious school, but the Court was careful to avoid any comment
on the substantive merit of their establishment clause theory. In
Michigan v. Long,3 0 the Michigan Supreme Court had invalidated
a police search, in an opinion that cited both federal and state authorities. The jurisdictional issue presented was whether the
United States Supreme Court could review this judgment. In finding that it could, the Court made no final determination on the
merits of the federal fourth amendment issue.3 1 Statutory or judgemade limits on federal jurisdiction for the sake of federal-state
3 2 are predicated on the
comity, like the rule of Younger v. Harris,
availability of a fair state forum. 3 Again, the jurisdictional issue is
merely where the suit should be litigated, and not who should win
on the merits.
Even so, jurisdictional rules have subtle and significant substantive implications. Spelling them out, as I do in the ensuing
paragraphs, is an essential first step in my argument. At this point,
only the substantive effects of jurisdictional rules will be identified.

29. 454 U.S. 464 (1982).
30. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
31. The Court held that the initial search was permissible under the fourth amendment
The Michigan Supreme Court had not ruled on the question of the constitutionality of the
subsequent search of the trunk, however. The Court therefore declined to decide this question, and remanded the issue. Id. at 1053.
32. 401 U.S. 37, 53-54 (1971).
33. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 108 n.9 (1975); Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 577
(1973). See generally Collins, The Right to Avoid Trial:Justifying Federal Court Intervention into Ongoing State Court Proceedings, 66 N.C.L. REV. 49, 51 (1987) (discussing the
situations under which the noninterference rules will not apply).
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Whether these rules are motivated by substantive considerations is
a more complicated inquiry, and is examined in Part III.
1. Standing
Standing addresses the question of who can litigate a constitutional issue. 4 If every dispute could be litigated to a resolution on
the merits by someone, at some time, then standing would have no
substantive implications. However, standing rules sometimes place
obstacles in the way of anyone who may seek to raise certain kinds
of issues. If an organization of taxpayers, like the plaintiffs in Valley Forge, cannot challenge a transfer of property to a religious
school, because as taxpayers they have suffered no discrete injury,
then courts may never have the opportunity to rule on the validity
of such a transfer. On account of the jurisdictional rule, the government's substantive interest in supporting religion will prevail
over the contrary substantive interest in separation of church and
state.
Nor is this effect the only way in which standing rules have substantive impact. As part of the standing requirement, the Court
requires a causal connection between the injury and the relief
sought. In Warth v. Seldin,33 for example, low income residents of
nearby communities sought to challenge on constitutional grounds
the zoning practices of Penfield, a wealthy suburb of Rochester.
The plaintiffs were denied standing because the Court thought
they were too poor to afford to move into the town even if the
zoning rules were overturned. As in tort law, this rule on causation
has an impact on substantive rights and duties. 6 The stricter the
causation requirement, the weaker the government's constitutional
obligations, however demanding they may appear in the abstract.
34. See, e.g., Valley Forge ChristianCollege, 454 U.S. at 473-74 (1982); Flast v. Cohen,
392 U.S. 83, 98-100 (1968).
35. 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
36. See Chayes, The Supreme Court, 1981 Term-Foreword: Public Law Litigation and

the Burger Court, 96 HARV. L. REv. 4, 19 (1982); Malone, Ruminations on Cause-In-Fact,9
STAN. L. REv. 60 (1956).
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2. Supreme Court Review
Because Supreme Court review benefits only the losing party in
the state court, rules that broaden access to Supreme Court review
when the grounds for the state judgment are unclear will favor that
party's substantive interests. If the rules on Supreme Court review
had a random impact, sometimes helping one substantive interest
and sometimes another, then it would be wrong to say that the
rules themselves have substantive impact. The myriad random applications would cancel each other out. In practice, the problem of
whether Supreme Court review is appropriate commonly comes up
in just one fact pattern, and the party who profits substantively
from expanded review is readily identifiable. This fact pattern
arises when a criminal defendant in state court raises two defenses
to the prosecution, one based on the federal Constitution, the
other on a parallel state constitutional provision. For example, in
Michigan v. Long3 7 a defendant challenged the admission of evidence against him on both state and federal fourth amendment
grounds. If the state court relies on the state ground, then the Supreme Court is powerless to review, because such a ruling is adequate to support the judgment no matter how the federal issue is
decided. Supreme Court review is available only if both the state
and federal issues are decided against the individual raising the
federal claim, or if the state court finds in his favor by relying on
the federal issue.
Suppose the grounds for the state decision are unclear. The
Court then has a choice to make, and the choice will indirectly affect the substantive rights and duties of the individual and the
state. Long expanded Supreme Court review in these cases, ruling
that the Court will presume reliance on the federal ground if the
state court opinion is ambiguous.3 8 By giving the state a chance to
challenge the state court judgment, this holding obliquely furthers
the state's interest in regulating conduct free of federal restraints.
The individual asserting a constitutional claim never gains by expansions of Supreme Court authority like Long, because under settled law he already has access to the Supreme Court when he loses

37. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
38. Id. at 1040-42.
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in state court. Expanding Supreme Court review to more cases
when the state loses in state court can only help the state.
3. Access to Federal District Court
If no differences existed between federal and state courts, then
the question of how to allocate constitutional cases between them
would stir little controversy. In that event, both sides would be
indifferent to forum rules. Yet, whether to permit access to federal
court for litigants with constitutional claims is one of the hardest
fought issues in the law of federal courts. For example, in Younger
3 9 the
v. Harris
Supreme Court denied access to federal district
courts to litigants who could raise their federal claims in pending
state proceedings, citing as its justification comity between federal
and state courts.
The reason litigants care so much about this seemingly arid
topic is that, in reality, significant differences exist between federal
and state courts, and these differences influence outcomes in constitutional litigation. Federal courts are more likely to favor constitutional claimants, even in the Reagan era, while state courts are
relatively more sympathetic to positions the state espouses.40 Because of this divergence, the rules on access to federal court have
substantive impact. Granting access to federal court will tend to
promote the individual's interest in imposing constitutional limits
on government, while channelling those cases to state court will
further the state's interest in regulation.
The differences in outlook between federal and state courts stem
from institutional differences between them. Article III grants life
tenure to federal judges; most state judges are elected or appointed
for fixed terms. Federal judges are far fewer in number, and they
are chosen from a larger pool.41 For example, California has more

39. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
40. See Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 28, at 1050-52; Neuborne, The Myth of Parity,90
HARv. L. REv. 1105, 1115-28 (1977); Redish, supra note 23, at 483-84; Resnik, The Mythic
Meaning of Article III Courts, 56 U. COLO. L. REv. 581, 611-17 (1985). On the impact of the
Reagan appointments, see Note, All the President'sMen? A Study of Ronald Reagan's Appointments to the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 87 COLUM. L. l~v. 766 (1987); Noble, Not Many
Judges Practice What the President Preaches, N.Y. Times, Nov. 29, 1987, at E4, col. 1.
41. Neuborne, supra note 40, at 1121.
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state trial judges than the entire federal court system. 42 Consequently, as a group federal judges are probably more talented.43
They are generally paid more, and the selection process for federal
judges focuses more on competence and less on patronage. 44 For all

of these reasons, federal judges are likely to be bolder and more
self-confident in striking down state legislative or executive decisions. Federal judges often face constitutional questions in the
more detached setting of a habeas proceeding or a request for declaratory or injunctive relief, rather than in the milieu of a criminal courtroom. 45 Less exposed to the rough and tumble of criminal
litigation, federal judges may be less cynical than state judges regarding the value of constitutional rights of criminal defendants.46
In view of these differences, constitutional claimants quite naturally seek to litigate in federal court,47 and the state often prefers
state court, each party seeking whatever edge it can get from the
forum choice. The point is not that either federal or state judges
have an improper bias in favor of one set of litigants. Every judge
must exercise judgment, and judgment is in part the product of the
experiences of a person's life and the attitudes he has formed as a
result of them. Allocation rules will have an indirect, but important, substantive impact on the resolution of close issues of fact or
law, where the conscious or unconscious attitudes judges bring to
their task may prove decisive.48
II. JURISDICTIONAL POLICY, INSTITUTIONAL ROLES, AND FEDERAL
COURTS DOCTRINE

Although jurisdictional decisions have substantive consequences,
Supreme Court opinions always deny any substantive motivation
for them. Rather, the Court explains this body of law in terms of
the institutional role of the federal courts in our system of government. This part of the Article lays out the Supreme Court's ac42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1122.
Id. at 1125.
Id. at 1125-26.
See, e.g., Eisenberg & Schwab, The Reality of ConstitutionalTort Litigation,72 CORNELL L. REv. 641, 655 n.72 (1987).
48. See Wells, Is Disparity A Problem?, 22 GA. L. REV. 283, 319-26 (1988).
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count of the reasons behind the rules of federal jurisdiction. The
discussion is necessary background for the argument, advanced in
Part HI, that the Court's explanation is largely a facade, behind
which it promotes substantive aims. Keep in mind that the following account is written from the perspective of an observer who
takes the Court's opinions at face value. The aim is to show, in
Part III, that the opinions deserve a more skeptical reading.
A. The Federal Courts and the FederalSystem
Thanks to the circumstances of its birth as a nation, the United
States is endowed with a rather complex governmental structure.
The United States began as a union of thirteen previously independent states, whose leaders had recently fought a war against
what they perceived to be a tyrannical government. The framers'
mistrust of power, and the insistence of the state governments on
keeping some of it for themselves, produced a division of governmental authority between the Nation and the states; each holding
some law-making power, each maintaining its own judicial system,
and each judicial system capable of deciding both state and federal
issues. Within the national government, power is divided among
the executive, legislative, and judicial branches, so that each
branch may serve as a check on the others.
These features of American government make it necessary to define the duties and prerogatives of the federal courts in relation
both to the other branches of the national government and to state
officers and state courts. The case law generated by this effort is
the subject matter of courses on federal courts. In each instance,
the fundamental problem is to decide how much power federal
courts may exercise, and, conversely, when they must defer to another branch of the federal government or to state courts. The resulting body of doctrine is intricate and elusive, because there are
good arguments both on the side of an expansive role for the federal courts and in favor of restrictions on their power, and some
fine distinctions must be made.
B. JurisdictionalPolicies and Their Implementation
In defining the role of the federal judiciary, the Court draws
from several sources. The basic rules are laid down in article III of
the Constitution, which marks the outer boundaries of federal ju-
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risdiction, and in federal statutes covering the scope of Supreme
Court review and district court jurisdiction. 9 Here, as in other areas of the law, the Court professes fidelity to legislative intent,5
and to its own precedents as well."1 On issues that cannot be resolved by reference to the Constitution, statutes or prior cases, the
Court follows a number of policies derived from or linked to the
Constitution and its aims. These policies all bear in one way or
another on the institutional role of the federal courts in the federal
system. The policies are: (1) maintaining the supremacy and uniformity of federal law; (2) showing due respect for state courts and
state governments; (3) enforcing the separation of powers within
the national government; and (4) economizing on the use of judicial resources. Each of these policies deserves a brief explanation.
One prominent feature of the constitutional plan, which advo-'
cates of a strong central government insisted on, is the supremacy
of federal law over state law.2 An essential element of any sound
legal system is some means for reconciling divergent decisions by
lower courts to achieve and maintain a uniform body of law.53 Toward these ends, article III mandates the creation of a national

49. For example, 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1982) governs Supreme Court review of state judgments, and 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982) controls the federal question jurisdiction of federal district courts.
50. E.g., Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980) (on the scope of 28 U.S.C. § 1738);
Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972) (on the scope of 28 U.S.C. § 2283).
51. See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751-52 (1984); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37,
45-49 (1971).
52. U.S. CONST. art. VI. See G. WOOD, THE CREATON OF THE AmERICAN REPUBLIC, 17761787, at 473 (1969). It is important to keep separate the supremacy policy and the constitutional claimant's interest in winning the lawsuit. Sometimes these factors will be congruent,
but they will often diverge. The supremacy policy is directed at assuring that settled constitutional law prevails in case of conflict with federal statutes or state law. The constitutional
claimant's interest in winning operates in situations in which no settled constitutional rule
exists, and when the question of law or fact at issue may be legitimately decided either for
or against him. Cf. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HAV. L.
REV. 593, 608-12 (1958) (legal terms have a core of settled meaning and a penumbra of
debatable meaning). Because the state's interest in pursuing its objectives free of constitutional restraints is itself a value with constitutional dimensions, see Bator, supra,note 22, at
631-34, maintaining constitutional supremacy may actually require rejecting the constitutional claimant's position.
53. See Bator, CongressionalPower Over the Jurisdictionof the Federal Courts, 27 VmL.
L. REv. 1030, 1041 (1981-82).

1989]

SUBSTANTIVE INTERESTS

513

Supreme Court and authorizes Congress to institute and assign judicial business to other federal courts.54
Supremacy and uniformity of federal law, taken alone, would
call for a prominent role for the federal courts; but our Constitution is complex. It creates a federal system, in which power is divided between the national and state governments. Sometimes, as
in the eleventh amendment's bar on suits in federal court against
state governments, deference to states is constitutionally required.55 More often, federal statutes such as the anti-injunction
act,5 6 or the Supreme Court's common law "principle of comity"
enforce such deference.
Within the national government, the separation of powers
among three branches calls for limitations on judicial power. Sensitive to its status as the antidemocratic branch of government in a
nation founded on the principle of majority rule, the Court seeks
to avoid unnecessary constitutional decisions and to eschew judicial intervention unless the litigant seeking it makes a compelling
case that he is so entitled. In recent years the Court has implemented these policies chiefly through its standing doctrine.5 9
In addition to these weighty considerations of public policy, the
Court also considers the need to encourage efficiency in litigation
and economy in the use of judicial resources in making federal
courts decisions. The Court accomplishes this end chiefly through
rules that disfavor duplicative litigation. For example, the doctrine
of pendent jurisdiction announced in United Mine Workers v.
Gibbs allows federal and state claims arising out of the same factual background to be tried in one federal court suit,6 0 and Allen v.
54. U.S. CONST. art. III § L See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 26, at 3-5, 10-11.
55. The eleventh amendment provides: "The Judicial power of the United States shall
not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against
one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any
Foreign State." U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
56. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1982) (forbidding federal courts to enjoin state proceedings except
in certain specified circumstances).
57. E.g., Fair Assessment in Real Estate Ass'n v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100, 105 (1981).
58. See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750-52 (1984); Valley Forge Christian College
v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State, 454 U.S. 464, 471-76 (1982).
59. In addition to Allen and Valley Forge, see Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101-02
(1983); Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38 (1976); Warth v.
Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498-502 (1975).
60. See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726-27 (1966).
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McCurry61 precludes relitigation of issues already adjudicated in
state court.
The Court invokes one or more of these policies to explain virtually every aspect of its doctrine on standing, Supreme Court review, and the division of jurisdiction between federal and state
courts. This Article now turns to the Court's account of each of
these doctrines.
1. Supreme Court Review of State Judgments
The premier case on this topic is Martin v. Hunter's Lessee,6 2 in
which the state of Virginia challenged the constitutional validity of
Supreme Court review of state court judgments. The Court upheld
its authority, relying on the need for federal review to assure the
uniformity of federal law and the supremacy of federal law over
state law.63 No doubt Martin is right, for the framers had agreed
on creation of a national Supreme Court for just this reason. 4
In later cases the Court refined the Martin principle, giving
weight to the more restrictive policies. In Murdoch v. Memphis,"5
the Court limited its review to the federal issues in the case, reasoning that the uniformity and supremacy policies did not support
review of state law issues. At the same time, leaving the state law
issues untouched avoided undue friction with the state courts. 6
After Murdoch the Court cut back further on the scope of review.
When the state court has relied on a state as well as a federal
ground, the Court will not even review the federal issue so long as
the state ground is adequate to support the judgment.6 7 The policy
basis of this rule is avoidance of unnecessary constitutional decisions and economy of judicial resources."'

61. 449 U.S. 90 (1980).
62. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
63. Id. at 340-48.
64. See C. WARREN, THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 326 (1929).
65. 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1875).
66. Id. at 631-33. See Meltzer, State Court Forfeitures of Federal Rights, 99 HARV. L.
REV. 1128, 1133-34 (1986).
67. See, e.g., Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 126 (1945); Fox Film Corp. v. Muller, 296
U.S. 207, 210 (1935). On the question of what counts as an adequate state ground, see Meltzer, supra note 66, at 1137-45.
68. See Herb, 324 U.S. at 125-26.
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What if the state opinion cites both federal and state law, leaving it unclear whether it relies on the federal or state grounds or
both? The Court formerly remanded the case for clarification, 9 or
closely examined the state court's opinion for guidance,7 0 or presumed that the decision rested on state law grounds. 71 Each of
these approaches can be justified under the principle that the
Court should decide constitutional questions only when they can
not be avoided. However, in Michigan v. Long, the Court discarded
all three of these techniques, and, invoking the uniformity principle, announced that henceforth it would presume reliance on the
72
federal ground when the state court's opinion is ambiguous.
Without federal review of state decisions that may have relied on
federal law, courts in different states may reach divergent results
on federal issues.7 3 Only a "plain statement" by the state court
that its judgment rests on state law will save it from Supreme
74
Court review.
2. The Allocation of ConstitutionalAdjudication Between Federal and State Courts
Our focus now shifts from Supreme Court review to the division
of jurisdiction between federal district courts and state courts. Ordinarily, federal courts may hear any case in which the plaintiff's
cause of action arises under federal law. The hard issue is how to
handle lawsuits in which the plaintiff seeks to challenge some action by state or local government on federal constitutional grounds.
This type of case presents a sharp clash between the supremacy
and uniformity policies and the desire to avoid undue interference
with state court prerogatives. Here the need to maintain federal
supremacy through federal jurisdiction seems especially great, because state courts may be loathe to interfere with state officers. At

69. E.g., Department of Motor Vehicles v. Rios, 410 U.S. 425, 427 (1973) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting); Minnesota v. National Tea Co., 309 U.S. 551, 555 (1940).
70. E.g., Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 732-33 n.1 (1983) (plurality opinion); Jankovich v.
Indiana Toll Road Comm'n, 379 U.S. 487, 489-92 (1965).
71. E.g., Lynch v. New York ex rel. Pierson, 293 U.S. 52, 54 (1934). See also Philadelphia
Newspapers v. Jerome, 434 U.S. 241, 244-45 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
72. 463 U.S. 1032, 1040 (1983).
73. See id.
74. Id. at 1041.
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the same time, the Court recognizes that a state has a strong interest in settling these matters in its own courts, and that the eleventh amendment sometimes accords constitutional status to the
state's interest in freedom from suit in federal court.
According to the Court, this sharp clash between contrary jurisdictional policy aims is largely responsible for the convoluted body
of law permitting access to federal court for some of these cases,
and allocating some of them to state court. In summarizing the
rules, it is helpful to distinguish between plaintiffs seeking damages and those requesting injunctive or declaratory relief. Under
Monroe v. Pape5 and Monell v. Department of Social Services, 6
most suits against local governments and state officials to recover
damages for constitutional violations may be brought in federal
court. The foundation for these rulings is the Court's reading of
the legislative intent of a statute passed in 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Damage suits against the state itself are barred in federal court by
the policy against intrusion on the states, embodied in the eleventh
amendment." The immunity against federal damages suits can be
abrogated only if Congress has specifically authorized suit against
the state. 8
Ex Parte Young79 established an exception to the eleventh
amendment immunity for suits to obtain injunctive relief against
unconstitutional action by a state officer, and the Court also applies this exception to requests for declaratory relief. The Court
explains Young as a compromise between the anti-intrusion policy
and the supremacy policy. Injunction suits must be allowed to enforce the fourteenth amendment, but permitting actions for damages would too severely compromise state sovereignty. Edelman
75. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
76. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
77. See, e.g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
78. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976). Fitzpatrick held that Congress may
abrogate the immunity when it acts pursuant to the power granted it in section 5 of the
fourteenth amendment to enforce the substantive provisions of that amendment. Whether
Congress may abrogate the immunity when acting under its other powers is still an open
question. See, e.g., Welch v. Department of Highways, 107 S. Ct. 2941, 2946 (1987). It may
be resolved in a case to be decided this term, United States v. Union Gas Co., 832 F.2d 1343
(3rd Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 1219 (1988).
79. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
80. Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 104-06 (1984).
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v. Jordan limited this exception to suits for prospective relief, explaining that retrospective relief, even if it is labeled "equitable
restitution," was too much akin to damages.8 '
Some limits on federal jurisdiction apply to both damages and
injunctions. Relying on the eleventh amendment's anti-intrusion
policy, Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Haldermans2 barred
any monetary or injunctive federal relief against a state officer on
8 3 denies acstate law grounds. The doctrine of Younger v. Harris
cess to federal court to enjoin pending state proceedings, because4
the cost of these intrusions into state prerogatives is too high,
and because there is no lack of parity between federal and state
courts.8 " Lower federal courts have applied this rule to bar federal
suits for damages as well, but the Supreme Court has not yet ruled
on that issue."
3. Standing
Standing deals with whether the party seeking relief is an appropriate litigant to assert the issues he raises.8 7 The problem is that
many constitutional rights, unlike common law rights, are held in
common. Virtually anyone may plausibly claim harm from certain
kinds of unconstitutional government action, such as aid to religion in violation of the establishment clause. On the other hand,
no one may be able to show any particular harm to himself, apart
from the generalized grievance. 8
Should anyone, or no one, be allowed to bring suit to redress
such a violation? In answering this question, the Court has focused
on the role of the federal courts in our system of government. The
jurisdictional policy of assuring the supremacy of federal law favors broad standing to raise such issues, for only the courts can
81. 415 U.S. 651, 665 (1974).

82. 465 U.S. at 106.
83. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
84. See Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 427-30 (1979); Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452,
460-61 (1974).
85. See, e.g., Moore, 442 U.S. at 430; Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 611 (1975).
86. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 26, at 1431-32.
87. See Brilmayer, The Jurisprudence of Article III: Perspectives on the "Case or Controversy" Requirement, 93 HARv. L. REv. 297, 297-98 (1979).
88. See Nichol, Injury and the Disintegrationof Article III, supra note 23, at 1919-22
(1986).
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ultimately determine whether the challenged practice is constitutional, and a relaxed injury requirement is necessary to get the issue before the courts. In Flast v. Cohen,8 9 decided in 1968, the
Court endorsed this reasoning, permitting taxpayers to challenge
congressional aid to religious schools on first amendment grounds.
The jurisdictional policy against standing to assert generalized
grievances is sensitivity to the separation of powers, which in this
context refers to a policy of restricting the exercise of judicial
power by avoiding unnecessary constitutional decisions. In 1982,
the Court abandoned the policy foundation of Flast. Emphasizing
the federal courts' limited role, the Court ruled in Valley Forge
Christian College v. Americans United For Separation of Church
& State that taxpayers have no standing to challenge a transfer of
property by the executive branch of government to a religious
school."
Allen v. Wright9l illustrates another aspect of the contemporary
Court's standing doctrine. In Allen, blacks challenged an IRS policy that allegedly permitted segregated private schools to obtain
tax-exempt status. As a result, the plaintiffs' children were deprived of the opportunity to attend integrated public schools. The
Court found that the injury was sufficiently discrete. The Court
denied standing, however, because the plaintiffs could not show a
causal connection between the alleged illegality and the claimed
injury.9 2 Even if the IRS acted illegally, a change in IRS policy
might not result in any change in the policy of the segregated
schools. Such schools may prefer to remain segregated despite the
loss of tax-exempt status. Again, the Court relied on the separation
of powers, and, more specifically, on the need to limit the exercise
of judicial power to situations in which a compelling need for judicial intervention exists.9 3

89. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
90. 454 U.S. 464, 471-82 (1982). See generally Nichol, Standing on the Constitution: The
Supreme Court and Valley Forge, 61 N.C.L. REv. 798 (1983) (discussing the Supreme
Court's rejection of shared constitutional injury as adequate to support standing, and suggesting a new analysis that would permit diffuse constitutional norms to support standing).
91. 468 U.S. 737 (1984).
92. Id. at 758-59.
93. Id. at 759-61.
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DISCERNING JUDICIAL MOTIVATION

Jurisdictional policy is far less important in accounting for federal courts doctrine than the Court says it is. Closer examination of
the cases reveals serious inadequacies in the Court's technique for
justifying its rules. Cases that are alike in terms of jurisdictional
policy are routinely treated differently, while legislative intent and
precedents are ignored with disconcerting regularity. The decisions
make sense only when we bring their substantive effects into the
analysis. A more convincing explanation for much of the law in this
area is that the Court's invocation of jurisdictional policy, precedent, and statutory or constitutional purpose is often merely a
facade, behind which the Court designs jurisdictional rules in an
effort to achieve substantive goals.
The method employed here for determining the true motivation
for federal courts decisions is to compare the Court's treatment of
a variety of doctrinal problems. In this way the persuasive force of
the Court's reasons and the Court's fidelity to those reasons can be
evaluated as it moves from one discrete issue to another. If the
Court's jurisdictional policy reasons are not persuasive grounds for
the result it reaches, there is a good chance the Court has some
hidden agenda. Even when the Court's reasons in a given case can
withstand scrutiny, they may not be the real, or the most important, bases for the holding. If the Court applies its analysis consistently over a range of problems, where the substantive effects of its
rulings vary from one case to the next, then we can conclude confidently that the institutional role of the federal courts is the focus
of the Court's attention, as the Court claims it is. However, if glaring inconsistencies appear as we move from one context to the
next, if many of the seemingly inconsistent rules have the same
substantive impact, and if the Court discards jurisdictional policy
reasons advanced in one area and replaces them with other jurisdictional policy reasons in the next area, then there are good
grounds to suspect that jurisdictional policy is not what really
counts. Rather, jurisdictional policy is merely a convenient rationalization for results whose true motivation is their substantive
impact.
Seeking to divine concealed motivations by comparing cases and
by evaluating the persuasive force of the Court's stated reasons is a
tricky business, and any conclusions drawn must be tentative ones.
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Nonetheless, the inquiry is worthwhile. To disdain it because it is
speculative would be to foreclose the possibility of getting closer to
the truth about this unruly body of cases. The better course is to
go ahead with the analysis in spite of its hazards, set forth the
reasons for believing the Court pursues a concealed substantive
agenda, and let the reader decide for himself whether this approach contributes something of value to the discussion of these
decisions.
A. Pennhurst and Respect for State Courts
Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman" is the most
important eleventh amendment case handed down in recent years.
Ex Parte Young, 95 decided in 1908, held that the eleventh amendment prohibition on suits against states in federal court did not
bar a suit to enjoin unconstitutional action by a state official. The
official was "stripped of his official or representative character"9s
when he acted unconstitutionally. Young was a landmark in the
law of constitutional remedies, because it allowed persons to challenge state action on fourteenth amendment grounds via a federal
suit for injunctive relief rather than solely by violating the law,
submitting to a state prosecution, and raising the federal issue as a
defense.97
Such a request for injunctive relief may rely on state law as well
as federal law. A year after Young, in Siler v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co.,9 the Court told federal courts faced with such a
case to try first to resolve it on the state law ground, in order to
avoid unnecessary constitutional decisions. Seventy-five years
later, Pennhurst repudiated Siler, finding it a violation of the eleventh amendment to grant injunctive relief against a state officer on
state law grounds.99 So stated, Pennhurst seems a proper application of the policy against unwarranted intrusion by federal courts
94. 465 U.S. 89 (1984).

95. 209 U.S. 123 (1908). See generally C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 286-92 (4th
ed. 1983) (an historical review of federal restraint on state officials).
96. 209 U.S. at 160.
97. See C. WRIGHT, supra note 95, at 290.
98. 213 U.S. 175, 192-93 (1909).
99. 465 U.S. 89, 106 (1984). See Shapiro, Wrong Turns: The Eleventh Amendment and
the Pennhurst Case, 98 HARV. L. REv. 62, 65 & nn.29-30 (1984).
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on state authority. True, the decision ignores seventy-five years of
practice to the contrary, the avoidance policy suffers, and efficiency
in the use of judicial resources is impeded if litigants bifurcate
their suits between federal and state court. However, the eleventh
amendment is a constitutional prohibition, and to the extent the
noninterference policy has constitutional stature it must prevail
against other considerations. In any event, even if the Court's policy choice was unwise, the problem seems to be strictly one of jurisdictional policy with no substantive dimension.
A careful examination of Pennhurst casts doubt on this "institutional role" explanation for limiting federal court power. The problem with the case is in specifying precisely how a federal injunction
based on state law amounts to an unwarranted intrusion into matters within the state's authority. In Pennhurst, there was no federal interference with a state judicial proceeding, as in Younger v.
Harris.10 0 If the objection is that federal courts should never tell
state officers what to do, then the ruling squarely contradicts Ex
Parte Young,10 1 which found the eleventh amendment no impediment to such federal orders. If Young is distinguished on the
ground that the court there invoked federal law, while the injunction in Pennhurst was based on state law, a curious anomaly appears. An intrusion is acceptable when founded on a body of law
outside the state's control, but not when a federal court enforces
the state's own law.
Ann Althouse offers an explanation for this distinction. She
thinks that Pennhurstis justified by the state's interest in controlling the development of state law. In her view, "a state's loss of
control over its statutory creations inhibits a state's functioning,"
and "the risk of finding themselves bound to expensive and burdensome federal injunctions would provide states with a major disincentive to reform their own institutions."' The danger that can
give rise to these perverse results is that federal courts might misunderstand and misinterpret state law.1°0 As long as federal courts

100.
101.
102.
103.

401 U.S. 37 (1971).
209 U.S. 123 (1908).
Althouse, supra note 21, at 1513.
Id. at 1522.
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construe state law correctly, they do not take control over the
state's creations and the state need fear no usurpation.
However, if federal court mistakes are the problem, then Pennhurst is a wildly disproportionate and costly solution, especially
when a less disruptive alternative device is already available. The
Pullman abstention doctrine was designed to deal with the
problems that arise when federal courts face unsettled state law
issues on which they may err.104 Pullman directs federal courts to
hold the case in abeyance while the parties seek an authoritative
answer from the state courts on the state law issue. 10 5 When state
law is clear, as it was in Pennhurst,0 6 federal application of state
law does not result in "a state's loss of control over its own statu' 107
tory creations.
For these reasons, I am unpersuaded that Pennhurst rests on
any jurisdictional policy. A more likely explanation for the result is
that the Court was influenced by the substantive implications of
its holding. The Court's rejection of injunctions based on state law
has important consequences for the litigation of federal claims. After Pennhurst a litigant with both state and federal theories of recovery must either litigate both theories in state court or split up
the case into two parts, at increased expense. If he chooses the latter alternative to preserve access to federal court for his federal

104. Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 499-501 (1941). See Shapiro, supra
note 99, at 79 & n.109.
105. See England v. Board of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 429-30 (1964) (Douglas,
J., concurring).
106. The court of appeals relied on a recent state supreme court opinion that spoke directly to the substantive state law issue. Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 673
F.2d 647, 651-56 (3d Cir. 1982), rev'd, 465 U.S. 89 (1984) (reviewing In re Schmidt, 494 Pa.
86, 429 A.2d 631 (1981)).
107. Althouse, supra note 21, at 1513. Pullman abstention may not be the best solution.
Professor Field has argued that Pullman abstention is itself a clumsy, expensive device that
is sometimes manipulated to serve substantive ends and that ought to be abandoned in
favor of certification of state issues to the state supreme court. See Field, The Abstention
Doctrine Today, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 590, 602, 605 (1977). The facts of Pennhurst, where a
federal court undertook to oversee the reform of a large state institution, suggest that federal deference may be appropriate even when the abstract commands of state law are crystal
clear. Perhaps the appropriate response to these problems is to institute a more flexible
abstention doctrine. See Shapiro, supra note 99, at 78-79 & n.108. See also Pennzoil Co. v.
Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 11 n.9 (1987) (calling for more focus on the purpose of abstention
doctrines in easing tensions between state and federal court, and more flexibiity in their
application).
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issues, and if the state litigation moves through the courts faster,

then he may find himself bound to the state court's adjudication of
issues common to the two cases under the principle of collateral
estoppel. 108 Indeed, he may find that the whole federal suit is
barred because he could have brought the federal cause of action
in his state litigation. 109
The substantive angle to this strategy relies on the premise that
state courts are more likely to favor state substantive interests
than federal courts.110 By encouraging litigation of the whole case
in state court, the Court may be trying to give the state an edge in
the underlying substantive litigation. The plaintiff with federal
constitutional claims is encouraged to go to state court because of
the expense of bifurcating, but then must face an unsympathetic
forum. If Pennhurst were the only piece of evidence for this conclusion, I would be reluctant to read such a machiavellian design
into the case. Discussion of more of the Court's federal courts cases
will show that this substantive reading of the case fits neatly into a
broader theme.
B. Michigan v. Long and Uniformity of FederalLaw
The policy of avoiding unnecessary constitutional decisions is
the basis of the Court's three traditional approaches to the issue of
whether to review ambiguous state decisions. The problem in this
area is that the Court only reviews decisions resting on a federal
ground, and some state court opinions cite both federal and state
law in support of their holdings. How should the Court proceed?
One technique is to presume that the decision rests on a state
ground, another is to send the case back to state court for clarification, and the third is for the Supreme Court itself to examine the
decision and its reasoning and determine whether it turns on state
or federal law."' Under each of these approaches the Court takes
108. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980).
109. See Migra v. Warren City School Dist., 465 U.S. 75 (1984). See also P. Low & J.
JEFFRIES, FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW OF FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS
piro, supra note 99, at 80-81.

110. See sources cited supra note 40.
111. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 26, at 547-52.

835-38 (1987); Sha-
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care to avoid decision of a constitutional issue if a state ground
adequate to support the judgment exists.
Michigan v. Long" 2 was a state criminal prosecution in which
the defendant challenged the introduction of evidence as a violation of the federal fourth amendment and a breach of the parallel
state constitutional provision. The state court excluded the evidence, citing both federal and state authority in the opinion. Addressing the question of its own jurisdiction to review, the Supreme Court recounted its history of shifting back and forth
among the three alternatives, and concluded that it should discard
all three. In their place the Court raised a presumption that ambiguous decisions rest on the federal ground." 3 This approach extends Supreme Court review over state judgments, and thus expands the Court's opportunity to decide federal constitutional
issues. The Court's approach is therefore altogether incompatible
with the avoidance policy.
That Long is based on a substantive aim of making it easier to
reverse state decisions that favor persons with constitutional
claims does not follow simply from the abandonment of avoidance
policy. Perhaps some other jurisdictional policy is more important
than avoidance in the Long context. The majority in Long
stressed the need for uniformity in federal law." 4 Because state
courts may reach divergent decisions on federal law, state decisions
that may have rested on federal grounds must be reviewable by the
Supreme Court. The flaw in this rationale is its reliance on the
paramount importance of uniformity. In comparison with other
contexts, uniformity shows itself to be a policy of exceedingly variable strength.
Uniformity would be served by rules that generally allocated
federal law decision making to the federal rather than the state
courts, because fewer differences are likely to exist between a
dozen or so federal appellate courts than among fifty state supreme
courts, and the differences that arise are resolved more easily. Yet
the Supreme Court allocates federal decision making to state
courts routinely, both in defining the "arising under" jurisdiction

112. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
113. Id. at 1038-42.
114. Id. at 1040-41.
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of federal district courts, 11 5 and in restricting access to federal
court for constitutional challenges to state action. 118 Uniformity of
federal law would also be served by making federal common law
rules of national applicability when a sufficient federal interest justifies a departure from Erie v. Tompkins.11 7 Yet the contemporary
Supreme Court often chooses to borrow state law in this situation. 8 Why then does uniformity become so important in the context of Supreme Court review of state judgments? In view of the
Court's neglect of uniformity in other contexts, it is hard to give
credence to Long's reliance upon that policy as the justification for
the new rules.
Ann Althouse does not think uniformity is an adequate basis for
the rule in Long. She defends the decision on another process-oriented ground. State courts should be accountable to their state
constituencies in the development of state law. If state courts can
avoid Supreme Court review by using ambiguous reasoning to explain a decision, the voters and state legislatures may be misled
into thinking that the decision rests on federal grounds and cannot
be changed. The state court will have succeeded in avoiding accountability to the Supreme Court by mixing in some state
grounds, and in avoiding accountability to the state legislature by
mixing in some federal grounds. 1 9
The defect in this defense of Long is the gap between means and
ends. If the goal is state court accountability, then the correct approach to the problem of ambiguity is to ask them what they
meant. The Court can then be absolutely sure whether the decision
rests on state or federal law, and it will be clear whether the state
court is accountable to the citizens and legislature of the state or
to the Supreme Court. The Court's presumption, on the other
hand, allows federal review of some cases in which the state court

115. See Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804 (1986); Franchise Tax
Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1 (1983).
116. See, e.g., Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v. Dayton Christian Schools, 477 U.S. 619
(1986); Fair Assessment in Real Estate Ass'n v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100 (1981); Huffman v.
Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975).
117. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
118. See, e.g., United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715 (1979); Miree v. DeKalb
County, 433 U.S. 25 (1977).
119. Althouse, supra note 21, at 1509.
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really did mean to rely on state law and to be accountable to state
authorities and not the Supreme Court.
The Court's presumption permits it to extend its reach to cases
in which there is no serious ambiguity, and hence no serious problem of accountability. An example is Kentucky v. Stincer,12 0 in
which the state court opinion overturning a conviction mentioned
the federal Constitution only in passing. The issue was whether excluding a criminal defendant from a hearing to determine the competency of a witness violated the right to confront one's accusers, a
right found in both the federal and Kentucky Constitutions. The
state court dwelt on state law and state cases interpreting state
law. 121 No fair reading of the opinion would find any serious ambiguity as to its grounds or danger that the opinion might be lacking
in accountability.' 12 Yet the Court seized on the brief reference to
federal law, addressed the federal issue, and reversed the state
12 3
court judgment.
It is hard to locate any credible jurisdictional policy foundation
for the result in Long. When the focus turns to the substantive
impact of the decision, however, the decision fits easily into a major theme of the Burger Court. Long extends jurisdiction over issues of criminal procedure when state courts, guided by ambitious
Warren Court precedents, have expanded the rights of criminal defendants. On the merits of these issues, the Court since 1970 has
retreated steadily from those precedents. Long facilitates the
120. 482 U.S. 730 (1987).
121. See Stincer v. Commonwealth, 712 S.W.2d 939, 940-41 (Ky. 1986), rev'd, 482 U.S.
730 (1987). Although the opinions in Stincer and its precursors mention the federal Constitution, by far the dominant theme in each of them is the right of confrontation granted by
the Kentucky Constitution.
122. See Dershowitz, John Hart Ely: Constitutional Scholar, 40 STAN. L. REV. 360, 367
(1988).
123. A defender of Long might point out that the state court is free to reinstate its decision by relying exclusively on state law. In this regard the sequel to Stincer is revealing. The
Kentucky Supreme Court faced, and rejected, just such a request in a later case, See v.
Commonwealth, 746 S.W.2d 401 (Ky. 1988). What is noteworthy is the court's framing of
the issue. The court did not ask whether its own state's constitution required that the defendant be present. It asked whether "the exclusion of a defendant from a hearing to determine the competency of a witness is so violative of a basic right guaranteed by the Kentucky
Constitution that we should place ourselves in direct opposition to an opinion of the
United States Supreme Court." Id. at 402 (emphasis added). It is hard to escape the inference that a majority of the Kentucky court felt intimidated by the United States Supreme
Court. See also id. at 404 (Stevens, C.J., dissenting).
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Court's substantive program by removing an obstacle to review of
1 4
state opinions that reflect Warren Court heresies. "
C. Younger and its Progeny
Younger v. Harris1 25 was the first of a series of cases by which
the Court has shifted some kinds of constitutional litigation from
federal to state courts. In Younger the federal court plaintiff was a
criminal defendant in state court, charged with violating a law
against inciting revolution. Asserting first amendment rights, he
sought a federal injunction to stop the state proceeding. The Court
dismissed his case without reaching the merits of his first amendment claim. The Court relied on the policies against unnecessary
federal intrusions on state courts and efficiency in litigation. In
particular, enjoining a state proceeding would insult state judges,
disrupt the administration of justice in state courts, and duplicate
the work already begun by the state court.12 The Court gave these
institutional costs more weight than the countervailing interest,
based on uniformity and supremacy, in a federal forum for the assertion of federal claims.
In Younger, and some early post-Younger cases, the Court did
not let these countervailing values go unheeded. The Court observed that in general federal law may be enforced by raising the
federal claims as a defense in the state proceeding. 1 7 When the
state tribunal is biased, 2 s or the prosecution was brought in bad
faith, 1 29 or the state tribunal lacks jurisdiction over the federal

124. If the Court took state cases upholding federal claims, and then affirmed the state
courts in a large share of them, its practice might be explained in terms of the supremacy
and uniformity policies. In fact, it generally reverses state courts in these cases, and in this
respect its practice differs sharply from that of the Warren Court. See Michigan v. Long,
463 U.S. 1032, 1069-70 (1983) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Sager, FairMeasure: The Legal Status of Underenforced ConstitutionalNorms, 91 HARv. L. REV. 1212, 1243-44 (1978). Examples of post-Long reversals of ambiguous state judgments favoring the constitutional claimant include Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 (1986); Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493
(1984); Florida v. Meyers, 466 U.S. 380 (1984); Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984);
California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 993 (1983). See also Hart & Wechsler, supra note 26, at 554.
125. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
126. See Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 462 (1974).
127. 401 U.S. at 46.
128. Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 577 (1973).
129. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 48-49, 53 (1971).
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claim, s° a federal court may go forward. The plaintiff in Younger
sought to enjoin a pending state proceeding. In Steffel v. Thompson1"3' the Court said the federal case survives when the state has
instituted no prosecution. The Court explained that in such a case
the justifications for abstention were absent; because there was no
state proceeding, there was no interference with state processes,
and thus no danger of disruption, duplication and insult.'3 2
If this account stated the full scope of Younger abstention, then
that doctrine could be explained persuasively in terms of jurisdictional policy. In fact, the Court has pushed it well beyond these
modest bounds, invoking Younger to justify deference to state
courts when the institutional costs of federal intervention are far
less compelling. A good illustration is Hicks v. Miranda,13 3 in
which the federal suit was filed first, but a state prosecution was
brought soon afterward. In terms of the institutional costs analysis,
the federal suit should go forward, yet the Court dismissed it, explaining that a contrary result would "trivialize" Younger.3 4 This
characterization strongly implies that the real reason for Younger
was to prefer a state forum whenever one is readily available, and
not the policy of minimizing disruption, insult, and duplication ad35
vanced in Steffel.
Nor is Hicks an isolated case. The Court has ordered abstention
when the federal claims are merely permissive counterclaims and
not defenses,' when the state administrative proceeding is judicial in nature,13 7 when the constitutional claim cannot be raised in
the administrative proceeding itself but only on later judicial review of it,' and when the plaintiff is not involved in any state
proceeding but complains about state executive action like police

130. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 108 n.9 (1975).
131. 415 U.S. 452 (1974).
132. Id. at 462-63 (holding that declaratory relief may be awarded in such circumstances
even if injunctive relief is inappropriate).
133. 422 U.S. 332 (1975).
134. Id. at 349-50. See Field, supra note 23, at 722-23.
135. See Wells, supra note 48, at 316.
136. See Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 429-30 & n.12 (1979).
137. Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423 (1982).
138. See Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v. Dayton Christian Schools, Inc., 477 U.S. 619, 629
(1986). See also id. at 633-34 n.5 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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brutality, 39 or illegal tax collection. 140 At the same time the Court
insists that no disparity between federal and state courts exists,'4
so that the plaintiff's interest in access to a federal forum is minimal at best. 4 2
Because the institutional costs argument for federal restraint is
weak in the absence of a pending state judicial proceeding, and
because federal and state courts are really not interchangeable,' 43
there are good grounds to be wary of the Court's rationale for its
rulings in this area. Given the Court's general preference for state
substantive interests in constitutional litigation in the years since
Younger,144 the Court more likely uses these jurisdictional rulings
as an indirect means of pursuing that substantive agenda. State
courts, on account of their institutional characteristics, are more
likely to decide close constitutional issues in favor of the state.
Consequently, allocating constitutional cases to state court will insidiously promote state substantive interests.
Before leaving Younger, it is worthwhile to consider the contrast
between this doctrine and Michigan v. Long 45 with regard to respect for state courts. In the Younger line of cases, the Court returns to this theme again and again. The Court speaks of "the
139. See, e.g., Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 112 (1983); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362,
379-80 (1976).
140. Fair Assessment in Real Estate Ass'n v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100, 110-16 (1981). In
addition to the restrictions the Younger doctrine imposed, another group of Burger Court
decisions limits access to federal court on habeas corpus for state prisoners seeking to raise
constitutional objections to their confinement. See, e.g., Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478
(1986) (federal habeas may be barred by attorney error in state court); Kuhlman v. Wilson,
477 U.S. 436 (1986) (limiting successive petitions); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982) (all
claims in a habeas petition must be exhausted through state courts before the federal court
will consider any of them); Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539 (1981) (admonishing district
courts generally to defer to state court fact-finding); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976)
(barring habeas for fourth amendment claims if the state provides a full and fair opportunity for raising them in state court).
141. See, e.g., Deakins v. Monaghan, 108 S.Ct. 523, 530 (1988); Allen v. McCurry, 449
U.S. 90, 105 (1980); Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 430 (1979); Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420
U.S. 592, 611 (1975).
142. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 493-94 n.35 (1976).
143. See sources cited supra note 40.
144. See, e.g., United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478
U.S. 186 (1986). See also Tribe, Seven Deadly Sins of Straining the Constitution Through
a Pseudo-Scientific Sieve, 36 HASTINGs L.J. 155 (1984); Stone, 0. T. 1983 and the Era of
Aggressive Majoritarianism:A Court in Transition, 19 GA. L. REv. 15 (1984).
145. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
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principle of comity,"' 148 "a proper respect for state functions, 1 4 7
the "threat to our federal system' 48 of government if federal adjudication is allowed, and the need to minimize the "friction between
our federal and state systems of justice.' 1 49 By contrast, in Long
the Court instructed state courts on the composition of their opinions. The Long majority brazenly declares that its rule shows respect for state courts, 150 but the rule itself belies this assertion.
Under Long, state courts must include a "plain statement" indicating that the result turns on state law,' 5 ' and hence are left with
much less discretion in the reasoning and phrasing of their decisions. Even an explicit declaration might not be enough to save a
state decision from Supreme Court review. 52 Whatever the merits
of Long, it hardly manifests deference to state courts.' 5 ' The
Court's lack of respect in Long for the prerogatives of state courts
reinforces doubts about the supposed "comity" foundations for
Younger.
Although tensions exist between Younger and Long in terms of
jurisdictional policy, from a substantive perspective, the two doctrines are entirely harmonious. Both of them favor state substantive interests in regulating conduct or otherwise governing as it
pleases, over the individual's interest in imposing constitutional restraints on state action. Younger pursues this end by allocating
cases to state courts, which will be more likely than federal courts
to favor state interests in adjudicating close questions of fact or
law. In the event a state court rules in favor of a constitutional
claimant, Long furthers state regulatory interests by extending the
availability of Supreme Court review over the state court decision.
The case for Long and Younger is shaky in terms of jurisdictional

146. Fair Assessment in Real Estate Ass'n v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100, 105 (1981).
147. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971).
148. Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 423 (1979).
149. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 491 n.31 (1976) (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,
412 U.S. 218, 259 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring)).
150. 463 U.S. at 1040-41.
151. Id. at 1044.
152. Id. at 1041 & n.6.
153. See also Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 108 S. Ct. 2510 (1988) (shielding military contractors from suit under state tort law by creating a federal common law immunity
that displaces state tort law).
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policy, but both rulings promote the contemporary Court's substantive agenda.
D. Standing
If the substantive implications of Pennhurst,Long, and Younger
15 4
are subtle and attenuated, standing decisions like Valley Forge
and Allen v. Wright15 5 have a more straightforward substantive
impact: when constitutional challengers are denied standing, constitutional violations will sometimes go uncorrected. Such a result,
standing alone, is hardly a sufficient basis on which to question the
Court's credibility when it asserts jurisdictional policy grounds for
its rulings. Once again, a broader perspective furnishes firmer
grounds for doubting the Court's motives. Compare Valley Forge
with the 1968 case of Flast v. Cohen, 5 ' in which opponents of aid
to religious schools were granted standing in spite of arguments
based on the separation of powers and the avoidance policy. The
Court in Valley Forge refused to follow Flast, explaining that in
Flast the plaintiffs challenged a congressional spending program,
while Valley Forge involved an attack on a decision by an official
of the executive branch.157 This difference is a dubious ground for
distinguishing the earlier case. From the perspective of keeping the
federal courts within their proper bounds and avoiding unnecessary constitutional decisions, which the Court in Valley Forge
viewed as the keystone of standing doctrine,' 58 this difference is
unimportant.
Perhaps Valley Forge and Flast reflect differences in the value
the Court accords uniformity and supremacy on the one hand, versus avoidance on the other. Under this view of the cases, the War-

154. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church &
State, 454 U.S. 464 (1982).
155. 468 U.S. 737 (1984).
156. 392 U.S. 83 (1968). See Chayes, Public Law Litigation and the Burger Court, 96
HARv. L. REv. 4, 10-11 (1982).
157. 454 U.S. at 478-80. This distinction was available to the Court in Valley Forge because Flast had relied on the "nexus" between the claimed establishment clause violation
and the congressional spending power for standing. This result was necessary to avoid a
conflict with Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923), which had held that suits by
taxpayers to challenge federal expenditures were generally not justiciable. See P. Low & J.
JEFFRIES,

supra note 109, at 40-42.

158. 454 U.S. at 488-90.
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ren Court's broad standing rule in Flast gave more weight to uniformity and supremacy, while the Burger Court's restriction on
standing in Valley Forge was based on avoidance. The decisions
differ, but both were founded on jurisdictional policy and not substance. The difficulty with this explanation is that rulings in other
contexts undermine the premise that the Warren Court really
cared much about uniformity for its own sake, and that avoidance
was truly important to the Burger Court.
With regard to Valley Forge and the Burger Court, recall that
Long spurned avoidance in favor of uniformity, while Pennhurst
rejected avoidance when it conflicted with protecting state sovereignty. The low regard for avoidance in these cases is all the more
striking, because the Court had to break with settled practice to
achieve its aims. When uniformity of federal law conflicted with
the Warren Court's egalitarian substantive program, that Court
chose to ignore uniformity. In United States v. Yazell,'5 e the issue
was whether to apply a uniform federal common law rule or to follow varying state laws on what property would be exempt from
attachment to satisfy a defaulted federal loan. Specifically, the
Court had to decide whether an impoverished woman's separate
property could be attached, when she and her husband had defaulted on a federal disaster loan and state law would shield her
assets. The Court explained that national uniformity was not important in this context and held state law applicable. 1 0
To conclude that the two decisions on standing reflect differences in the weight given the values underlying the establishment
clause by the Burger and Warren Courts is more plausible. The
Warren Court's broad standing rule helped to enforce establishment clause restraints on government aid to religion, while the
Burger Court's narrow rule weakened them. This explanation is
consistent with the Court's shift, in substantive decisions on the
establishment clause, from a vigorous opposition to government
sponsored religion in the sixties to a more relaxed attitude in the

159. 382 U.S. 341 (1966).
160. Id. at 354-58. Similarly, if the Warren Court had been interested in uniformity for its
own sake, then surely it occasionally would have found state court decisions going too far in
the protection of federal rights. See Sager, supra note 124, at 1244 & n.101 (finding not even
one reversal of a state court decision favoring the claimant on a constitutional civil liberties
issue between 1960 and 1969).
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seventies and eighties.16' The explanation also accords with the
Court's use of jurisdictional rules to attain substantive ends in
Pennhurst,Long, and the Younger doctrine.
6 2 read in isolation, may reflect a policy of judiAllen v. Wright,"
cial abstinence when judicial action probably will not help the
party seeking relief. But the sincerity with which the Court holds
this view is open to serious doubt.1 3 Duke Power Co. v. Carolina
64
Environmental Safety Group1
allowed a fifth amendment challenge to a federal statute limiting liability for nuclear power plant
disasters, although no disaster had yet occurred. 6 5 The "injury"
complained of was environmental harm from the ordinary operation of the power plant, but it was far from clear that the relief
sought, striking down the statute, would lead to the abandonment
6
of the power plant and an end to the plaintiffs' injury. 1
To understand why the Court granted standing, one must keep
in mind the importance to the nuclear power industry of getting an
early answer to the substantive question,6 7 and the Court's ruling
upholding the damage ceiling on the merits. 6 8 Duke Power and
161. Compare Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (addition of creche by city in
Christmas display held not violative of establishment clause) and Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S.
388 (1983) (state income tax deduction for expenses incurred in providing "tuition, text
books and transportation" for children attending elementary or secondary school held not
violative of establishment clause) with Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203
(1963) (state or local school board action requiring recitation of Bible passages in public
schools held violative of establishment clause) and Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968)
(state "anti-evolution" statute held violative of establishment clause).
162. 468 U.S. 737 (1984). See also Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26
(1976); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
163. Even on its own terms, Allen and other decisions obliging the plaintiff to meet strict
causation requirements have significant substantive effects. The stricter the causation requirement, the weaker will be the protection afforded constitutional rights. See Nichol, Causation as a Standing Requirement: The Unprincipled Use of JudicialRestraint,69 Ky. L.J.
185, 195-96, 205-06, 217-18 (1980-81); Tushnet, The New Law of Standing: A Plea for
Abandonment, 62 CORNELL L. REv. 663, 681-84 (1977); cf. Malone, supra note 36 (demonstrating that rules on cause in fact in tort law reflect substantive policy choices). However, if
the Court were consistent in applying this strict test, a tenable argument could be made
that its substantive impact is a side effect of a rule motivated by separation of powers
concerns.
164. 438 U.S. 59 (1978).
165. See Chayes, supra note 36, at 20-22 (1982).
166. See Nichol, supra note 163, at 200-01, 206-08.
167. See 438 U.S. at 95 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
168. Id. at 82-94.
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other cases in which the Court has allowed attenuated causal relationships to suffice16 9 show that when the Court values a substantive interest highly enough it will find a way to decide the merits.
When the plaintiffs are black or poor, this aspect of standing becomes a stringent test. The operative difference between when
standing is allowed and when it is denied is the nature of the substantive rights at stake, not differences in the strength of jurisdictional policies. 170

E. Historical Perspectives
Comparisons among recent cases make a persuasive argument
that the modern Supreme Court habitually employs jurisdictional
rules to achieve substantive ends. Yet the practice is hardly unique
to the current Court. On the contrary, it is a theme running
through the Court's work since the early nineteenth century. This
Article will not undertake to prove this assertion through a lengthy
series of comparisons of opinions from earlier eras in the Court's
history. Rather, this section considers three landmark cases, and
explains why substance is the most likely foundation for each of
them.
1. Osborn v. Bank of the United States and the Scope of District
Court Jurisdiction
In Osborn v. Bank of the United States,17 ' the issue was the
scope of the jurisdiction of the federal courts under the article III
provision extending federal judicial power to cases "arising under"
federal law. 1 2 Chief Justice Marshall's opinion for the Court set
down an extraordinarily broad rule, allowing federal jurisdiction
whenever a federal issue forms an "ingredient" of the case, in the
169. See, e.g., Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 271-78 (1979); University of Cal. Regents v. Bakke,
438 U.S. 265, 283-99 (1977). For a good discussion of these cases, see Nichol, supra note 163,
at 208-12.
170. See Nichol, Abusing Standing: A Comment on Allen v. Wright, 133 U. PA. L. REV.
635, 658-59 (1985). See also Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 475 U.S. 534 (1986)
(when the plaintiffs seeking to assert constitutional rights were religious conservatives, the
liberal wing of the Court voted against standing, and conservatives voted for standing, each
group breaking from its usual approach).
171. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
172. Id. at 818.
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sense that a federal issue might be litigated.17 3 Under this test, a
suit by the federally chartered Bank of the United States to recover in contract is within the "arising under" jurisdiction, even
though state contract law is the basis of the suit.17 4 This case is

within the arising under jurisdiction because the issue of the
Bank's authority to sue may be raised. The resolution of this issue
depends on the construction of the Bank's charter from Congress
and hence is a federal question. A federal court can hear the case
even if the federal issue is never actually raised.17 5 Osborn has been
criticized for the breadth of its holding, 76 and rightly so, for no
jurisdictional policy plausibly supports the "ingredient" rule. Federal uniformity and supremacy are implicated only when a federal
issue does arise, and litigating state law issues in federal court in
these circumstances seems an unwarranted intrusion on state court
authority.
Osborn only makes sense when viewed in its substantive setting.17 7 In the early nineteenth century many state governments
were hostile to the Bank because its domination of monetary matters diminished state power. As Justice Johnson pointed out in dissent, the Court was concerned that state courts might harm the
Bank by rulings that the Supreme Court could not correct easily
on appeal.17 8 For example, in the suit on a contract, the state court
might make findings of fact adverse to the Bank or read state law
so as to deny the Bank its putative rights. The substantive aim of
shielding the Bank against this possibility, 179 and, more generally,
the policy of national control over money, are the motivating forces
behind the Osborn rule. If jurisdictional policy were the basis of
the rule, we might expect to see it applied more generally than
merely to the context for which it was invented. Yet the Court has
virtually always construed jurisdictional statutes far more narrowly
173. Id. at 821-24.
174. See Bank of the United States v. Planters' Bank, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 904, 904-05
(1824).
175. Osborn, 22 U.S (9 Wheat.) at 824-25.
176. See, e.g., Textile Workers' Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 481-82 (1957)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting). See also Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S.
480, 491-93 (1983).
177. See Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 481-82 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
178. See 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 871-72 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
179. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 26, at 984.
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than Osborn would permit,18 0 even when Congress seems to have
intended to allow jurisdiction as broad as Osborn.is"
2. Ex Parte Young and the Scope of Federal Remedies for
UnconstitutionalState Action
Ex Parte Young"s2 addresses the challenge of reconciling the
eleventh and fourteenth amendments. The eleventh amendment
bars suits against state governments in federal court. s3 It dates
from 1798, an era when few constitutional limits on state governments existed. The fourteenth amendment, enacted in 1868, imposes significant federal restrictions on state governments. Young
permitted federal suits against state officers for injunctive relief on
fourteenth amendment grounds in spite of the eleventh amendment. The reasoning of the opinion, that the state officer is
"stripped of his official or representative character"'8 4 when he
acts unconstitutionally, is transparently false. The Court now calls
it a "fiction."' 185 In policy terms, the Court explains Young as a
compromise between the eleventh and fourteenth amendments. To
assure the supremacy of federal fourteenth amendment rights,
suits for injunctive relief must be allowed; out of respect for state
sovereignty, damages and other retrospective relief are
prohibited."8 8
The weakness in this account of Young lies in its premise that a
federal forum is necessary to vindicate federal rights. On the day
the opinion came down, the Court also decided General Oil Co. v.
Crain. 17 General Oil was also a suit to enjoin state action on constitutional grounds, but here the plaintiffs sued in state court
rather than federal court. The state court dismissed the suit under
a state law denying state courts jurisdiction to grant injunctions

180. See, e.g., Merrell-Dow Pharmaceuticals v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804 (1986); Louisville
& Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908).
181. See Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 8 n.8
(1983). See also HART & WECHSLER, supra note 26, at 995-96.
182. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
183. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
184. 209 U.S. at 160.
185. Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 105 (1984).
186. Id. at 104-06.
187. 209 U.S. 211 (1908).
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against the state, and the Supreme Court reversed. The Court held
that state courts could not dismiss on state law grounds a challenge to state action founded on the federal Constitution. 88 This
ruling undercuts the "ensuring federal supremacy" rationale for
Young, because the availability of a state court forum means that
federal supremacy can be attained without the intrusion on state
sovereignty that a federal cause of action entails.
What then is the justification for Ex Parte Young? Recognizing
a federal cause of action can be explained plausibly only on the
premise of disparity between federal and state courts.' 89 If no gap
between federal and state courts exists, then nothing is gained in
the way of enforcing federal rights by providing a federal forum.
There is nothing positive to weigh in the balance against the intrusion on state sovereignty, and Young makes no sense. On the other
hand, if state courts are less sympathetic than federal courts to the
substantive values underlying constitutional claims, then a sound
substantive justification exists for allowing access to federal court:
constitutional claimants will prevail on the merits more often if
they are permitted to sue in federal court. Notice that this rationale is quite distinct from any argument based on jurisdictional policy or institutional role. 90

188. Id. at 225-28.
189. See sources cited supra note 40.
190. If state courts were so unsympathetic to federal rights that they could not provide a
constitutionally adequate forum for their adjudication, state court adjudication would not
serve federal supremacy, even with Supreme Court review to correct errors of law. Cf. Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 577 (1973) (Younger does not apply if state tribunal is biased). In that event, Ex Parte Young could be justified in terms of the supremacy policy,
notwithstanding Crain.
This rationale fails because the Court has never made a blanket judgment that state
courts are inadequate to provide a fair hearing for constitutional claims. On the contrary,
the Court has consistently refused to recognize a constitutional right to litigate constitutional claims in federal court. See, e.g., Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 102-05 (1980); Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 400-02 (1973); Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182, 18789 (1943). Cf. Neuborne, supra note 40, at 1119 (although differences between state and
federal courts exist, and these differences affect outcomes, nonetheless "[w]e are not faced
today with widespread state judicial refusal to enforce clear federal rights."). Institutional
differences matter on "arguable issues" that could legitimately be decided either way. Id. at
1119-20. Accordingly, the basis for granting access to a federal trial forum in Young must be
a preference for the individual's substantive interests and not the neutral supremacy policy.
For more on the distinction between jurisdictional rules based on the supremacy policy
and rules based on substantive considerations, see supra note 52.

538

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:499

The historical context in which the case arose bolsters this explanation of Young. In the early part of this century, the Court's
doctrine of substantive due process for the protection of economic
interests was at its zenith.191 The federal plaintiff in the litigation
giving rise to Young was a railroad objecting on due process
grounds to state ceilings on freight rates. The jurisdictional rule
announced in Young was designed to help plaintiffs like this railroad to prevail on the merits and thereby enhance the Court's substantive agenda of protecting economic interests against state regulation.192 Young is the mirror image of Younger. Just as the latter
case allocates constitutional litigation to state court in an effort to
diminish the effective scope of constitutional protection, Young
channels litigation to federal court in order to broaden that
protection.
3. Monroe v. Pape and the Emergence of Constitutional Tort
In Monroe v. Pape193 the Court revived a statute passed ninety
years earlier, finding that in enacting the Civil Rights Act of
1871194 Congress intended to create a federal cause of action for
damages or injunctive relief arising from virtually any fourteenth
amendment violation. The holding on injunctive relief is superfluous in view of Young, but the newly available damages remedy has
191. See, e.g., Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S.
45 (1905). See also Hovenkamp, The Political Economy of Substantive Due Process, 40
STAN. L. REV. 379, 383 (1988) (citing Young as an example of judicial activism on behalf of
economic substantive due process).
192. See Neuborne, supra note 40, at 1106-08 (discussing Young as well as other cases
from the period).
193. 365 U.S. 167 (1961). See generally Shapo, ConstitutionalTort: Monroe v. Pape and
the FrontiersBeyond, 60 Nw. U.L. REv. 277 (1965).
194. The statute is now codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). It provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes
to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. For the
purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of
Columbia.
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spawned one of the major areas of contemporary federal litigation.
On the face of the opinion, Monroe is merely an exercise in statutory interpretation and has nothing to do with either jurisdictional
policy or substantive values; but Justice Frankfurter and others
have demolished the Court's reading of legislative intent. The legislative history suggests strongly that the framers of the statute
intended to reach unconstitutional conduct sponsored or condoned
by the state, and not every violation committed by a state officer. 195 Moreover, studies of the case law on a range of section
1983 issues raise further doubts about the Court's sincerity; for the
Court is highly selective in its treatment of legislative intent as a
guide to resolving these issues, invoking or ignoring historical
materials from one case to another as suits its own purposes.19 6
A more plausible explanation for Monroe begins by noting that
it, like Young, was decided at a time of intense judicial activism on
behalf of broader constitutional rights against state governments.
In the 1960s, beneficiaries of this activism were blacks, criminal
defendants, unpopular speakers, rather than railroads, but this difference merely highlights the continuity of the Court's preoccupation with substance. In the 1960s, as at the turn of the century,
there was reason to doubt that state courts would protect those
federal rights as forcefully as federal courts. Just as Young made
an exception to the eleventh amendment, so Monroe poured new
content into an old statute. In both cases the Court acted with a
motive to achieve the substantive goal of advancing constitutional
protection. 197 In pursuit of that goal Young authorized federal
courts to order a halt to constitutional violations and to hold offenders in contempt. Monroe's damage remedy deters violations of

195. See Monroe, 365 U.S. at 211-46 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). See also Zagrans,
"Under Color of" What Law: A Reconstructed Model of Section 1983 Liability, 71 VA. L.
REv. 499 (1985) (recapitulating Frankfurter's dissent); Eisenberg, Section 1983: Doctrinal
Foundations and an Empirical Study, 67 CORNELL L. REv. 482, 484-522 (1982) (a more
general examination of legislative intent).
196. See Kreiner, The Source of Law in Civil Rights Actions: Some Old Light on Section
1988, 133 U. PA. L. REv. 601, 604-11 (1985); Wells, The Past and the Future of Constitutional Torts, 19 CONN. L. REv. 53, 60-65 (1986).
197. See Neuborne, supra note 40, at 1108-10.
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federal rights and enhances those rights by making violators compensate their victims for the harm they do.19
IV.

CONCLUSION

Supreme Court opinions explain the law of federal courts in
terms of fidelity to precedent and legislative intent, and pursuit of
such jurisdictional policies as maintaining the supremacy and uniformity of federal law, promoting comity between federal and state
courts, and achieving efficiency in litigation. Yet the effort to understand the cases in these terms ends in frustration, for the
Court's actions belie its words. The Court gives short shrift to congressional intent and its own prior cases. A given jurisdictional policy takes on more or less weight as we move from one doctrinal
context to another, contradictions pile up, and the suspicion grows
that something else must be at work here.
What lurks behind all the decorative rhetoric about institutional
values is an oblique and shadowy struggle between two competing
substantive interests: the state's desire to pursue its legislative
goals unhindered by constitutional limits and the individual's interest in imposing constitutional restraints upon state action. Jurisdictional rules have subtle but significant implications for the
resolution of the merits of constitutional cases. As a result, opportunities arise for pursuing substantive goals by jurisdictional
means. By favoring the litigating interest of one side or the other
as it makes jurisdictional decisions, the Court can and does promote one or the other of these broad substantive ends. Much of
the contemporary law of federal courts, and some landmark decisions throughout our history, can be accounted for more persuasively as the product of this substantive conflict than as an effort
to realize any of the various jurisdictional policies. Substantive values are woven into the very fabric of federal courts doctrine.

198. Other Warren Court decisions that opened up federal courts to constitutional challenges, doubtless with the aim of boosting the substantive interests of the constitutional
claimant, include Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968) (taxpayer standing to assert establishment clause issues); Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965) (easing access to federal
court for constitutional challenges to state criminal statutes); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391
(1963) (permitting federal district courts to hear habeas petitions in spite of procedural default in state court).

